Interesante

Cómo Hong Kong cayó bajo la regla 'Un país, dos sistemas'

Cómo Hong Kong cayó bajo la regla 'Un país, dos sistemas'


We are searching data for your request:

Forums and discussions:
Manuals and reference books:
Data from registers:
Wait the end of the search in all databases.
Upon completion, a link will appear to access the found materials.

A la medianoche del 1 de julio de 1997, Hong Kong volvió al control chino después de un siglo y medio de dominio colonial británico. El traspaso estaba destinado a establecer una relación de "un país, dos sistemas" entre China y Hong Kong que duraría hasta 2047, con Hong Kong como región administrativa especial.

Desde la entrega, los residentes de Hong Kong han acusado a Pekín de extralimitarse en su autoridad. El Movimiento Paraguas fue una serie de protestas en 2014 que pidieron elecciones más transparentes para el director ejecutivo de la ciudad. A principios de 2016, los libreros de Hong Kong desaparecieron y luego aparecieron bajo custodia policial en China. Y en 2019 estallaron protestas en Hong Kong por un proyecto de ley para permitir la extradición a China continental.

He aquí una mirada retrospectiva a lo que llevó a la inusual relación de Hong Kong con China.

China cede la isla de Hong Kong en la Primera Guerra del Opio

Hong Kong estuvo bajo el dominio chino por primera vez durante la dinastía Qin en el siglo III a.C., y siguió siendo parte del Imperio chino durante unos 2000 años. Pero entre 1842 y 1898, el Imperio Británico tomó gradualmente el control de las tres regiones principales que conforman el Hong Kong actual: la isla de Hong Kong, la península de Kowloon y los Nuevos Territorios.

Todas estas regiones todavía estaban bajo control chino cuando el imperio entró en guerra con el Imperio Británico en 1839. Esta fue la Primera Guerra del Opio, llamada así porque China estaba tratando de evitar que los narcotraficantes británicos traficaran ilegalmente con opio en China (el tráfico había creó una crisis de adicción).

Durante la guerra, China cedió temporalmente la isla de Hong Kong al Imperio Británico con la Convención de Chuenpi de 1841. Cuando terminó la guerra en 1842, el Tratado de Nanjing obligó a China a ceder indefinidamente la isla del sur a los británicos.

El Imperio Chino transfiere el resto de Hong Kong al Imperio Británico

El control de la isla de Hong Kong le dio al Imperio Británico un mejor acceso al comercio chino. Ansioso por aún más, reanudó la lucha con China en 1856 y provocó la Segunda Guerra del Opio (a la que también se unió el Imperio francés). Cuando terminó la guerra en 1860, la Convención de Beijing obligó a China a ceder la península de Kowloon al sur de una línea divisoria conocida como Boundary Street.

El 1 de julio de 1898, el Imperio Británico negoció la Segunda Convención de Pekín con China, esta vez arrendando los Nuevos Territorios entre Boundary Street y el río Shenzhen, la línea divisoria moderna entre China continental y Hong Kong. El contrato de arrendamiento expiraba en 99 años, lo que significa que China esperaba que Gran Bretaña devolviera la región el 1 de julio de 1997.

Durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, el Imperio japonés interrumpió brevemente el control británico cuando ocupó Hong Kong (en ese momento, Japón también ocupaba la mayor parte del sudeste asiático). Después de la guerra, decenas de países de Asia, África y América se independizaron del control japonés y europeo. Pero Gran Bretaña siguió gobernando Hong Kong, uno de sus últimos grandes territorios coloniales.

Plazo para los enfoques de traspaso de nuevos territorios

En 1982, con la fecha de vencimiento del control británico de los Nuevos Territorios que se avecinaba, los líderes británicos y chinos se reunieron para negociar la transición.

Debido a que el contrato de arrendamiento de 1898 no se aplicaba a la isla de Hong Kong y la península de Kowloon al sur de Boundary Street, Gran Bretaña podría haber tratado de negociar la conservación de esas regiones. Sin embargo, la primera ministra Margaret Thatcher en última instancia no pensó que esas dos regiones serían capaces de sobrevivir por sí mismas, dice Steve Tsang, director del Instituto SOAS China de la Universidad de Londres.

Después de todo, el aeropuerto de Hong Kong, Shek Kong Airfield, estaba en la sección sobre Boundary Street a la que los británicos tenían que regresar.

Gran Bretaña decidió que cuando llegara la fecha límite, entregaría todo Hong Kong a China. Si Hong Kong apoyó el traspaso no fue parte de la discusión.

"¿Qué elección tenían?" Pregunta Tsang. “Si dijeran, 'No hay negociaciones', los chinos se harían cargo sin un acuerdo. Si declaran la independencia, el PLA [Ejército Popular de Liberación] invadirá. Así que ninguna de esas son opciones en realidad: la independencia no era una opción, negarse o rechazar la integración no era una opción ".

Hong Kong y China ingresan al acuerdo "Un país, dos sistemas" hasta 2047

En 1984, el Reino Unido y China firmaron la Declaración Conjunta Sino-Británica que describe su plan para Hong Kong.

Esta declaración estipulaba que Hong Kong se convertiría en parte de China el 1 de julio de 1997, pero que los "sistemas sociales y económicos actuales" y el "estilo de vida" en Hong Kong permanecerían iguales durante 50 años. En este arreglo de “un país, dos sistemas”, Hong Kong continuaría operando en una economía capitalista y los residentes continuarían teniendo derechos de expresión, prensa, reunión y creencias religiosas, entre otros, al menos hasta 2047.

En 2019, estallaron protestas por un proyecto de ley que muchos residentes de Hong Kong sintieron que violaría el acuerdo de "un país, dos sistemas" al permitir la extradición a China continental. El proyecto de ley permitiría a las autoridades locales detener y extraditar a delincuentes fugitivos que son buscados en territorios con los que Hong Kong no tiene acuerdos de extradición, incluidos China continental y Taiwán.

Los críticos del proyecto de ley argumentaron que podría conducir a lo que algunos han descrito como "secuestro legalizado". En ese momento, algunos manifestantes más jóvenes expresaron su preocupación por cómo será la vida en Hong Kong cuando la fecha de vencimiento de este acuerdo pase en 2047.


Hong Kong: por qué el modelo de "un país, dos sistemas" está en su última etapa

Niki JP Alsford no trabaja, consulta, posee acciones ni recibe fondos de ninguna empresa u organización que se beneficie de este artículo, y no ha revelado afiliaciones relevantes más allá de su nombramiento académico.

Socios

University of Central Lancashire proporciona financiación como miembro de The Conversation UK.

The Conversation UK recibe financiación de estas organizaciones

Los organizadores de la protesta en Hong Kong afirman que casi dos millones de personas, la mayoría vestidas de negro y muchas con flores blancas como símbolo de luto, salieron a las calles el 16 de junio mientras continuaban las manifestaciones por los cambios propuestos a la ley de extradición. Con una población total de poco más de siete millones, fue una muestra extraordinaria de política de base.

El “proyecto de ley de prófugos”, como se le suele llamar, permitiría la extradición a China, entre otros países. Hong Kong no tiene actualmente la obligación de repatriar a nadie a China, debido al modelo de “un país, dos sistemas” que entró en vigor tras su traspaso de 1997 del Reino Unido a China. La declaración conjunta, firmada por Beijing y Londres, establece claramente que el territorio gozará de libertad cívica y autonomía durante 50 años. En este acuerdo se consagra la independencia judicial de China.

Después de las protestas que atrajeron la atención de los medios mundiales, la directora ejecutiva de Hong Kong, Carrie Lam, acordó suspender el proyecto de ley, pero no eliminarlo, en lo que se consideró una importante caída del gobierno. Al disculparse por el proyecto de ley de extradición, Lam dijo que no se volvería a presentar hasta que se hubieran abordado los temores de la gente e indicó que ahora es poco probable que se apruebe antes del final de la sesión legislativa en 2020.

Sin embargo, los funcionarios se apresuraron a criticar a quienes se agitaban contra la legislación draconiana. Con el apoyo de Beijing, Lam se refirió a las protestas como "inaceptables para cualquier sociedad civilizada".

Si el proyecto de ley se aprueba, alteraría fundamentalmente la independencia judicial de Hong Kong y señalaría el comienzo del fin del modelo de “un país, dos sistemas”. El uso excesivo de la fuerza por parte de la policía contra quienes ejercen su derecho de protesta legalmente protegido demuestra lo cerca que está Hong Kong del final de ese camino.

Carrie Lam: Lo siento. Roman Pilipey / EPA


Por qué Taiwán observa muy de cerca a Hong Kong

Las protestas recurrentes en Hong Kong durante los últimos 13 fines de semana sugieren que el modelo de “un país, dos sistemas” (OCTS) no ofrece una fórmula mágica para combinar sistemas políticos incompatibles bajo una sola bandera. Hong Kong está observando de cerca, pero también Taiwán, la razón por la que China concibió OCTS.

En enero, Taiwán celebrará elecciones presidenciales y legislativas. Con las relaciones Taipei-Beijing en el centro de la campaña, así es como los disturbios en Hong Kong pueden influir en estas elecciones.

Hong Kong se convirtió en una región administrativa especial de la República Popular China (RPC) en 1997, al final de un contrato de arrendamiento de 99 años con Gran Bretaña. La Ley Básica bajo la cual Beijing prometió gobernar Hong Kong tiene sus raíces en el modelo OCTS. Afirma que Hong Kong sería parte del territorio soberano de la República Popular China, pero durante 50 años conservaría muchas de las características que lo diferencian de lo que los hongkoneses llaman el "continente".

"Un país, dos sistemas" y Taiwán

Cuando se fundó la República Popular China en 1949, su jurisdicción no se extendía a Taiwán, una isla a 100 millas de su costa. Desde entonces, China y Taiwán han tenido gobiernos separados. No obstante, Beijing reclama a Taiwán como su territorio y busca incorporar la isla a la República Popular China. OCTS, un concepto que Deng Xiaoping introdujo en 1978, fue diseñado para facilitar esa unión.

OCTS nunca ha tenido mucha moneda en Taiwán, la mayoría de los taiwaneses se oponen a la absorción en China. Menos del 10 por ciento aprueba la unificación, y muchos de ellos prevén que Taiwán se apodere de China, no al revés. La mayoría de los taiwaneses prefieren el status quo: ni la unificación con China ni una declaración formal de independencia.

La unificación es impopular, y también lo es OCTS. Incluso antes de que comenzaran las protestas de Hong Kong, una encuesta en marzo encontró que casi el 80 por ciento de los taiwaneses rechazaban el OCTS. Los disturbios en Hong Kong refuerzan su convicción de que el OCTS es incorrecto para Taiwán.

Taiwán es una democracia multipartidista y sus líderes prestan mucha atención a encuestas como estas. Si bien los problemas internos son importantes, la gestión exitosa de las relaciones con Beijing es primordial. La confianza de los votantes en la capacidad de los candidatos y partidos de Taiwán para mantener la relación estable y defenderse de la presión por la unificación tiende a ser la variable más importante que determina su elección de voto.

La suerte de Tsai Ing-wen estaba decayendo

Hace apenas unos meses, los expertos predecían pocas posibilidades de que la actual presidenta Tsai Ing-wen ganara un segundo mandato. Hace un año, sus índices de aprobación eran tan bajos que un titular de Los Angeles Times decía: "El presidente de Taiwán es ahora menos popular que Trump".

Hubo muchas razones para las bajas calificaciones de Tsai. Beijing rechazó el diálogo con el líder taiwanés y optó por intensificar su presión política, militar y económica. Los partidarios progresistas se sintieron decepcionados por la incapacidad de Tsai desde el principio para aprobar iniciativas como el matrimonio igualitario, mientras que los opositores atacaron sus políticas económicas.

En noviembre de 2018, el Partido Democrático Progresista (DPP) de Tsai, el gran ganador en 2016, fue aplastado en las elecciones locales. El otro partido importante de Taiwán, el Kuomintang (KMT), que aboga por un compromiso más estrecho con el continente, llegó a la victoria en la "Ola Han", una ola de apoyo para el político de afuera Han Kuo-yu, el candidato a la alcaldía del KMT en Kaohsiung, el segundo partido de Taiwán. -la ciudad más grande.

El trato de Beijing a Hong Kong elevó la posición de Tsai

Pero las casas de apuestas de Taiwán ahora tienen a Tsai nuevamente en la carrera. El cambio comenzó en enero, cuando defendió ferozmente la autonomía de Taiwán después de que el presidente chino, Xi Jinping, afirmara la determinación de Beijing de unificar las dos partes bajo la OCTS. El repunte continuó en mayo, cuando la legislatura aprobó el matrimonio igualitario, y se aceleró en junio, cuando Tsai rechazó un desafío primario.

Los disturbios de Hong Kong están impulsando aún más el impulso de Tsai. Hace un año, a muchos votantes les preocupaba que su negativa a aceptar los términos de diálogo de Beijing estuviera socavando la economía de Taiwán y provocando fricciones innecesarias. Estaban abiertos al mensaje del KMT de que las adaptaciones limitadas a China podrían reactivar la economía de la isla y reducir la presión política de Beijing para reunificarse.


Contenido

Período colonial Editar

La isla de Hong Kong fue ocupada por primera vez por británicos en 1841. La isla fue cedida oficialmente como colonia de la corona al Reino Unido del Imperio Qing en 1842 después de la Primera Guerra del Opio según los términos del Tratado de Nanking. Las otras partes de Hong Kong, Kowloon y los Nuevos Territorios fueron cedidas permanentemente y arrendadas por 99 años a Gran Bretaña en 1860 bajo la Convención de Pekín y en 1898 bajo la Segunda Convención de Pekín respectivamente. [4] [5] [6] Aunque el gobierno chino, gobernado por el Kuomintang liderado por Chiang Kai-shek inicialmente tenía la intención de recuperar el territorio, Gran Bretaña retomó el control de Hong Kong en 1945 después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, en la que Hong Kong fue ocupada por Japón durante tres años y ocho meses. Hubo pocos defensores de la descolonización de Hong Kong del dominio británico durante el período de posguerra, en particular Ma Man-fai y el Partido de Autogobierno Democrático de Hong Kong en la década de 1960, pero el infructuoso movimiento dejó de existir sin el apoyo sustancial de la público.

En los últimos años de la década de 1970 y principios de la de 1980, la cuestión de la soberanía de Hong Kong surgió en la escena política de Hong Kong a medida que se acercaba el final del contrato de arrendamiento de Nuevos Territorios. Hong Kong y Macao fueron eliminados de la lista de territorios no autónomos de las Naciones Unidas, en los que los territorios de la lista tendrían derecho a ser independientes, el 2 de noviembre de 1972 a solicitud de la República Popular China (RPC). Aunque había defensores de la independencia de Hong Kong, la mayoría de la población de Hong Kong, muchos de los cuales eran refugiados políticos, económicos o de guerra de la Guerra Civil China y el régimen comunista en China continental, deseaba mantener el status quo. Beijing rechazó la solicitud de un representante de Hong Kong en la negociación chino-británica. En 1984, los gobiernos británico y chino firmaron la Declaración Conjunta Sino-Británica que establecía que la soberanía de Hong Kong debería transferirse a la República Popular China el 1 de julio de 1997, y Hong Kong debería disfrutar de un "alto grado de autonomía" en virtud del "Uno "País, principio de dos sistemas".

De 1983 a 1997, Hong Kong vio un éxodo de emigrantes a países de ultramar, especialmente a raíz de la represión de la Plaza de Tiananmen en 1989, cuando más de un millón de hongkoneses se manifestaron en las calles para apoyar a los manifestantes estudiantiles en Beijing. La masacre de Tiananmen de 1989 fortaleció los sentimientos anti-Beijing y también condujo al surgimiento del movimiento democrático local, que exigió un ritmo más rápido de democratización antes y después de 1997.

Era temprana de SAR Editar

Desde 1997, la implementación de los artículos 45 y 68 de la Ley Fundamental de Hong Kong, que establece que el Jefe del Ejecutivo (CE) y el Consejo Legislativo (LegCo) deben ser elegidos por sufragio universal, ha dominado la agenda política en Hong Kong. El campo prodemocracia, uno de los dos alineamientos políticos más grandes del territorio, ha pedido la pronta implementación del sufragio universal desde la década de 1980. Después de que más de 500.000 personas protestaron contra la legislación de seguridad nacional estipulada en el artículo 23 de la Ley Fundamental el 1 de julio de 2003, el Comité Permanente de la Asamblea Popular Nacional (NPCSC) en abril de 2004 descartó el sufragio universal antes de 2012. [7]

Desde 2003, la creciente invasión de Beijing ha llevado a Hong Kong a integrarse cada vez más como parte de China. Como resultado, se percibió que las libertades y los valores fundamentales de Hong Kong se habían erosionado. [8] [9] En 2009 y 2010, la construcción de la sección de Hong Kong del enlace ferroviario de alta velocidad a Guangzhou (XRL) escaló a una serie de protestas masivas. Muchos manifestantes acusados ​​de que el gobierno de Hong Kong gastara HK $ 69,9 mil millones (US $ 9 mil millones) en un ferrocarril innecesario solo para complacer a Beijing. [10] Algunos también temieron que fuera en beneficio del Ejército Popular de Liberación para movilizar sus tropas más rápidamente. En 2012, el plan del gobierno para llevar a cabo la educación moral y nacional generó controversia ya que fue acusado de elogiar al Partido Comunista de China y la ideología nacionalista china mientras condenaba la democracia y los "valores occidentales". [11] La educación nacional y antimoral dirigida por el grupo de estudiantes Scholarism encabezado por Joshua Wong atrajo con éxito una gran participación de personas que asistieron a las asambleas, lo que llevó al gobierno a retroceder.

En 2011, surgieron sentimientos localistas, de los cuales algunos adoptaron la postura nativista antiinmigración, por temor a que los nuevos inmigrantes, turistas y comerciantes paralelos de China continental amenazaran las instituciones establecidas y las costumbres sociales de Hong Kong. De Chin Wan Sobre la ciudad-estado de Hong Kong, publicado en 2011, que aboga por una perspectiva "localista" y abandona el "sentimiento nacionalista chino", provocó un intenso debate público y fue popular entre la generación joven. [12] La teoría de Chin Wan tuvo una fuerte influencia en los activistas más jóvenes, quienes tenían un fuerte resentimiento contra los moderados pandemócratas nacionalistas chinos y su organización de los memoriales anuales de las protestas de la Plaza de Tiananmen de 1989 que tenían un "tema nacionalista chino". como ellos percibieron. Muchos de ellos también promovieron sentimientos nostálgicos por el dominio británico y ondearon banderas coloniales en asambleas públicas.

Aparición del movimiento independentista Editar

los Pregrado, la publicación oficial de la Unión de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Hong Kong (HKUSU), de febrero de 2014, publicó algunos artículos sobre el tema de una nación de Hong Kong, incluidos "La nación de Hong Kong decide su propio destino" y "Democracia e independencia para Hong Kong ". El presidente ejecutivo, Leung Chun-ying, utilizó su discurso de política de Año Nuevo de 2015 para dirigir duras críticas a la revista por promover la independencia de Hong Kong, que de hecho tuvo poca tracción hasta ese momento, avivando tanto el debate como las ventas del libro. Nacionalismo de Hong Kong que contó con los artículos. [13]

El 31 de agosto de 2014, el Comité Permanente de la Asamblea Popular Nacional (NPCSC) estableció una restricción sobre el método electoral del Jefe del Ejecutivo, en el que cualquier candidato debe ser examinado por un comité de nominaciones controlado por Beijing antes de presentarse a las elecciones. La decisión de la NPCSC de 2014 desencadenó una protesta histórica de 79 días que se denominó la "Revolución de los paraguas". El fracaso de la campaña por un proceso democrático libre y genuino fortaleció el discurso independentista, ya que fue visto como un fracaso del "Un país, dos sistemas" y un Estado independiente sería la única salida. Los grupos políticos localistas liderados por jóvenes se multiplicaron después de las protestas. Como algunos de ellos como Youngspiration tomaron el camino parlamentario al participar en las elecciones del Consejo de Distrito de 2015, otros como Hong Kong Indígena tomaron la "acción callejera" apuntando a los turistas del continente y comerciantes paralelos con un estilo militante de protesta. [14]

El 8 de febrero, durante las vacaciones del Año Nuevo chino de 2016, estallaron los disturbios civiles en Mong Kok entre la policía y los manifestantes tras la represión del gobierno contra los vendedores ambulantes sin licencia. La policía utilizó bastones y gas pimienta y se dispararon dos tiros de advertencia al aire, mientras que los manifestantes arrojaron botellas de vidrio, ladrillos, macetas y botes de basura hacia la policía y prendieron fuego a las calles. El principal participante en el evento, los indígenas de Hong Kong, un grupo político con tendencias independentistas, fue calificado por el director de la Oficina de Enlace de China en Hong Kong, Zhang Xiaoming, como "separatistas radicales" que estaban "inclinados al terrorismo". [15] El Ejército Popular de Liberación también emitió una declaración en la que responsabilizaba a "organizaciones separatistas radicales locales individuales" de los disturbios y criticaba a los medios occidentales por "embellecer los disturbios" en sus primeros informes. [16] Edward Leung, líder de los indígenas de Hong Kong que estuvo muy involucrado en los disturbios civiles, obtuvo un resultado mejor de lo esperado en las elecciones parciales de Nuevos Territorios del Este a finales de mes al obtener el 15 por ciento de los votos. Después del resultado, Leung afirmó que el localismo se había afianzado como la tercera potencia más importante en la política local, al lado de los campos pandemocracia y pro-Beijing. [17]

El Partido Nacional de Hong Kong, el primer partido que aboga abiertamente por la independencia de Hong Kong y una República de Hong Kong se estableció el 28 de marzo de 2016, provocando ataques de los gobiernos de Beijing y la RAE. La Oficina de Asuntos de Hong Kong y Macao del Consejo de Estado emitió una declaración condenando al partido, diciendo que "ha dañado la soberanía y la seguridad del país, ha puesto en peligro la prosperidad y estabilidad de Hong Kong y los intereses centrales de Hong Kong". [18] El Hong Kong El gobierno de Kong emitió una declaración después de la formación del partido, afirmando que "cualquier sugerencia de que Hong Kong debería ser independiente o cualquier movimiento para defender tal 'independencia' va en contra de la Ley Básica, y socavará la estabilidad y la prosperidad de Hong Kong y perjudicará el interés del público en general. El Gobierno de la RAE actuará de acuerdo con la ley ". [18]

Demosistō, un partido político liderado principalmente por ex líderes estudiantiles como Joshua Wong y Nathan Law en las protestas de Ocupar de 2014 establecidas el 10 de abril de 2016, abogó por un referéndum para determinar la soberanía de Hong Kong después de 2047, cuando el "Un país, dos sistemas" principio tal como se prometió en la Declaración Conjunta Sino-Británica y se supone que expirará la Ley Básica de Hong Kong. Demosistō formó una alianza electoral con otros de ideas afines, y enfatiza la noción de "autodeterminación democrática" en contraposición a la "autodeterminación nacional" de los grupos de derecha independentistas. Debido a su defensa del "referéndum", el Registro de Empresas y la policía retrasaron su registro como empresa o sociedad. El partido tampoco pudo abrir su propia cuenta bancaria para recaudar fondos. [19]

los Pregrado volvió a publicar un artículo en marzo de 2016 titulado "Declaración de la Juventud de Hong Kong" aboga por la independencia de Hong Kong al expirar la Declaración Conjunta Sino-Británica en 2047. Exige que se establezca un gobierno democrático después de 2047 y que el público elabore la Declaración de Hong Kong Constitución de Kong. También denuncia al gobierno de Hong Kong por convertirse en un "títere" del régimen comunista, "debilitando" la autonomía del territorio. Leung Chun-ying desestimó la afirmación e insistió en que "Hong Kong ha sido parte de China desde la antigüedad, y este es un hecho que no cambiará después de 2047". [20]

Supresión inicial Editar

Controversias de descalificación del Consejo Legislativo de 2016 Editar

En la elección del Consejo Legislativo de 2016, seis activistas independentistas fueron descalificados, incluidos Edward Leung, indígena de Hong Kong y Chan Ho-tin, del Partido Nacional de Hong Kong, por la Comisión de Asuntos Electorales (EAC), en la que el gobierno argumentó que su pro Las posturas de independencia no cumplían con el Artículo 1 de la Ley Básica que establecía que Hong Kong era una parte inalienable de China y la Ordenanza del Consejo Legislativo (Cap.542) § 40 (1) (b) que requería que todos los candidatos respetaran la Ley Básica y se comprometieran lealtad a la Región Administrativa Especial de Hong Kong. El 5 de agosto, los activistas independentistas de Hong Kong lanzaron una manifestación que se denominó "primera manifestación independentista en Hong Kong" y reunió a unas 2.500 personas. [21] Los localistas que participaron con éxito en la contienda se llevaron el 19 por ciento del total de votos en las elecciones generales bajo diferentes pancartas y consignas que abogaban por la "autodeterminación".

El 12 de octubre de 2016, en la reunión inaugural del Consejo Legislativo, dos legisladores de Youngspiration, Baggio Leung y Yau Wai-ching, tomaron el juramento del cargo como una oportunidad para hacer declaraciones a favor de la independencia. Los dos afirmaron que "Como miembro del Consejo Legislativo, haré todo lo posible para velar por los intereses de la nación de Hong Kong", desplegaron una pancarta de "Hong Kong no es China", insertaron sus propias palabras en los juramentos y mal pronunciado "República Popular de China" como "el pueblo re-follando de Chee-na". [22] Sus juramentos fueron invalidados por el secretario general de LegCo, Kenneth Chen, y posteriormente fueron impugnados por el gobierno en el tribunal. El 7 de noviembre de 2016, el Comité Permanente del Congreso Nacional del Pueblo (NPCSC) interpretó el artículo 104 de la Ley Fundamental de Hong Kong para "aclarar" la disposición de los legisladores de jurar lealtad a Hong Kong como parte de China cuando asuman el cargo. El portavoz de la Oficina de Asuntos de Hong Kong y Macao declaró que "[Beijing] no permitirá en absoluto a nadie que defienda la secesión en Hong Kong ni a ningún activista independentista entrar en una institución gubernamental". [23] En consecuencia, el tribunal descalificó a los dos legisladores el 15 de noviembre. [24]

Después de la descalificación de los dos legisladores, el gobierno lanzó la segunda ola de impugnaciones legales contra cuatro legisladores más a favor de la democracia que utilizaron la ceremonia de juramento, incluida la Ley Nathan de Demosistō y Lau Siu-lai, que dirigieron sus campañas con el lema de "autodeterminación". El 14 de julio de 2017, el tribunal destituyó a los cuatro legisladores. [25]

Fila de banner pro-independencia de universidades de 2017 Editar

El 4 de septiembre de 2017, la cuestión de la independencia de Hong Kong hizo una reaparición de alto perfil cuando las pancartas que pedían la independencia aparecieron en la Universidad China de Hong Kong (CUHK) durante la noche antes del nuevo año académico. El personal de la escuela los eliminó rápidamente. [26] Pancartas y carteles de la independencia aparecieron en más universidades cuando siete sindicatos de estudiantes unieron fuerzas para condenar la eliminación de las pancartas y carteles por parte de las autoridades del campus como una "erosión grave" de la libertad académica. [27]

Las disputas y enfrentamientos entre algunos estudiantes locales y del continente estallaron cuando varios estudiantes de China continental se agruparon para derribar los carteles que abogaban por la independencia de Hong Kong en el "muro de la democracia" del campus de CUHK. La acción de los estudiantes de China continental fue elogiada por la Liga Juvenil Comunista China, que compartió el video en su cuenta oficial de WeChat. [28] Un comentario titulado "Se debe establecer una regla para hacer criminal la independencia de Hong Kong" publicado en la propiedad estatal Diario de la gente El sitio web de la edición en el extranjero dijo que la discusión sobre la independencia de Hong Kong debería ser ilegal, al igual que es ilegal promover el nazismo en Alemania. [29]

El 11 de septiembre, la directora ejecutiva Carrie Lam denunció las pancartas y carteles a favor de la independencia, afirmando que el mensaje de los estudiantes contradecía el principio de "un país, dos sistemas" y la Ley Fundamental, "condeno la aparición continua de tales comentarios en la universidad campus universitarios, lo que es una violación de la soberanía, la integridad territorial y los intereses de desarrollo de nuestro país ", dijo. También insistió en que la libertad académica y la autonomía universitaria no eran excusa para propagar falacias. [30] El 15 de septiembre, diez directores de universidades de Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong Shue Yan University, Lingnan University, China University of Hong Kong, Education University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong La Universidad Politécnica de Hong Kong, la Universidad de Ciencia y Tecnología de Hong Kong, la Universidad Abierta de Hong Kong y la Universidad de Hong Kong, condenaron los "recientes abusos" de la libertad de expresión en una declaración conjunta, agregando que todas las universidades no apoyan Independencia de Hong Kong, ya que contraviene la Ley Fundamental. [31]

Controversia de descalificación de candidatos de 2018 Editar

En las elecciones parciales del Consejo Legislativo de marzo de 2018 para los cuatro escaños que dejaron vacantes los legisladores descalificados por la controversia de la toma de juramento, tres candidatos fueron descalificados por los escrutadores de la Comisión de Asuntos Electorales (EAC), incluida Agnes Chow de Demosistō sobre la base de que ella "no puede cumplir con los requisitos de las leyes electorales pertinentes, ya que defender o promover la 'autodeterminación' es contrario al contenido de la declaración que la ley exige que un candidato haga para defender la Ley Fundamental y jurar lealtad a la [ Región Administrativa Especial de Hong Kong]." [32] [33] La Unión Europea emitió una declaración advirtiendo que prohibir a Chow en las elecciones parciales "corre el riesgo de disminuir la reputación internacional de Hong Kong como una sociedad libre y abierta". [34] A los localistas Ventus Lau Wing-hong y James Chan Kwok-keung también se les prohibió postularse debido a su postura anterior a favor de la independencia.

En las elecciones parciales de noviembre, a Lau Siu-lai, legislador prodemocrático derrocado en la controversia sobre la toma de juramento, el oficial que regresa Franco Kwok Wai-fun le impidió participar en la carrera sobre la base de la defensa anterior de Lau de la autodeterminación de Hong Kong. , que demostró que no tenía ninguna intención de respetar la Ley Fundamental y de jurar lealtad a Hong Kong como región administrativa especial de China. [35] En el mismo mes, Enoch Yuen le preguntó al consejero legislativo Eddie Chu, que se postuló para las elecciones de Representante de la aldea en Yuen Long, si aceptaba respetar la Ley Básica, si aceptaba reconocer la soberanía de China sobre Hong Kong y si apoyó la independencia de Hong Kong. Chu reafirmó su posición de que nunca ha apoyado la independencia de Hong Kong: Abogo y apoyo la democratización de la Ley Fundamental y el sistema político, incluida, entre otras, la enmienda de los artículos 158 y 159 de la Ley Fundamental, como objetivo de Hong Kong. "autodeterminación después de que el gobierno central bloqueara el sufragio universal". El 2 de diciembre, se le dijo a Chu que su candidatura era inválida, lo que lo convirtió en el décimo candidato al que se le prohibió postularse en las elecciones por sus creencias políticas y el primero al que se le prohibió postularse en la aldea. -elección de nivel. [36]

Victor Mallet prohíbe la controversia Editar

En agosto, estalló una controversia en 2018 cuando la FCC organizó una charla a la hora del almuerzo con Andy Chan, coordinador del Partido Nacional de Hong Kong (HKNP), que tendrá lugar el 14 de agosto. Victor Mallet, vicepresidente de la organización de prensa, presidió la sesión. [37] Los gobiernos de China y Hong Kong habían pedido la cancelación de la charla, porque el tema de la independencia supuestamente cruzó una de las "líneas de fondo" de la soberanía nacional. [38] [39] Después de una visita a Bangkok, el gobierno de Hong Kong le negó a Mallet una visa de trabajo. [40] Mallet fue sometido a un interrogatorio de cuatro horas por agentes de inmigración a su regreso de Tailandia el domingo 7 de octubre antes de que finalmente se le permitiera ingresar a Hong Kong. [41]

En ausencia de una explicación oficial, el rechazo de la visa de Mallet fue ampliamente visto como una retribución por su papel en la presidencia de la charla de Andy Chan que la FCC se negó a cancelar. [37] [39] El secretario de Seguridad John Lee insistió en que la prohibición de Mallet no estaba relacionada con la libertad de prensa, pero se negó a explicar la decisión. [41] The incident caused a furious debate over restrictions to freedoms that were promised in the Sino-British Joint Declaration which included a "high degree of autonomy", democratic reforms, and maintenance of the freedom of the press. [42]

2019–20 protests and national security law Edit

In March, following months of protests, a poll by Reuters found that support for independence had risen to 20%, while opposition had fallen sharply to 56%, and those who were indifferent had doubled to 18%. [43]

In May 2020, after the decision on Hong Kong national security legislation was published, a US lawmaker Scott Perry proposed a bill "to authorize the President to recognize the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China as a separate, independent country, and for other purposes." [44] [45]

Political parties that support Hong Kong's independence include Hong Kong Indigenous, Hong Kong National Party and Youngspiration. Youngspiration calls for the right to self-determination of the "Hong Kong nation" on their sovereignty. Localist activist group Civic Passion has expressed its support for Hong Kong independence before, but later called for the amendment of the Basic Law of Hong Kong through a civil referendum in the 2016 Legislative Council election. [46] Before disbanding as a result of the 2020 Hong Kong national security law, Demosisto also called for the right to self-determination to determine Hong Kong's future after 2047 when the One Country, Two Systems principle as promised in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Hong Kong Basic Law is supposed to expire, although independence wasn't the party's position. [47] [48] Other parties, such as the Alliance of Resuming British Sovereignty over Hong Kong and Independence (BSHI) and the Hong Kong Independence Party, call for the return of British rule.

According to a survey conducted by the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute in December 2019, one-fifth of Hong Kong's population supported Hong Kong independence, while 56% of Hongkongers opposed it. [49]

Reasons Edit

Reasons that have been cited in favour of independence include:

  • Right to self-determination: Hong Kong people have the right to determine their own future as stated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. [47] Hong Kong was on the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, which are given the right to achieve independence, before it was taken down on the request of the People's Republic of China in 1972. [cita necesaria]
  • Lack of legitimacy of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law: Hong Kong people were barred from the negotiating process over the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong's sovereignty in the 1980s and most Hong Kong people were also absent from drafting the Hong Kong Basic Law, the mini-constitution of the Hong Kong SAR. [50]
  • Unrepresentativeness of the Hong Kong government: the pro-democrats criticise that the Chief Executive of Hong Kong is elected by the 1,200-member Election Committee, which is dominated by Beijing and does not represent the general will of the Hong Kong people. [51] About half of the seats in the Legislative Council of Hong Kong are elected through trade-based functional constituencies with limited electorates, which also heavily favour pro-Beijing politicians. The Hong Kong government is often criticised for listening only to Beijing and acting against Hong Kong's interests. [52] Despite the historic Occupy protests in 2014 calling for genuine universal suffrage, the Hong Kong government refused to make any concession in the electoral reform.
  • Beijing's encroachment on Hong Kong's autonomy: The Chinese government's growing encroachment on the Hong Kong's management on its own political, economic, and social affairs and failed to deliver free election as promised in the Article 45 and Article 68 of the Basic Law. [8][9] Beijing is also criticised for repeatedly violating the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the "One Country, Two Systems" as guaranteed by the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, as shown in the Liaison Office open meddling in the local elections, arbitrary interpretations of the Basic Law, the publication of the "One Country, Two Systems" White Paper and the alleged abductions of the Causeway Bay booksellers, among other allegations.
  • Hong Kong's distinct identity: Hong Kong people are majority Cantonese speakers and write in traditional Chinese and English with heavy influence of western culture and values, including the respect for freedom, human rights, democracy and the rule of law, which is claimed to be very different from Mainland China. They also perceive that the distinctive Hong Kong identity is under threat of the influx of the mainland immigrants and tourists as well as the "assimilation policies" of the Beijing government, including the Moral and National Education. The younger generations in Hong Kong increasingly do not identify as "Chinese", seeing themselves as either "Hongkongers" or mixed. [53]

Chinese and Hong Kong governments Edit

The Chinese government firmly opposes Hong Kong independence. Former Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping opposed British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's alternative proposals during the Sino-British negotiation in the early 1980s as he believed she "wanted to turn Hong Kong into some kind of an independent or semi-independent political entity". [54]

After the establishment of the Hong Kong National Party in March 2016, an editorial piece in the Chinese government-owned Global Times slammed the Hong Kong National Party by stating that it is "impossible to achieve" independence for Hong Kong and calling it "a practical joke" and "forefront of extremism". [55] The State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office issued a statement through the official Xinhua News Agency condemning the party: "The action to establish a pro-independence organisation by an extremely small group of people in Hong Kong has harmed the country’s sovereignty, security, endangered the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, and the core interests of Hong Kong. It is firmly opposed by all Chinese people, including some seven million Hong Kong people. It is also a serious violation of the country's constitution, Hong Kong's Basic Law and the relevant existing laws." [18] The spokesman of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office stated that "[Beijing] will absolutely neither permit anyone advocating secession in Hong Kong nor allow any pro-independence activists to enter a government institution," after the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) interpret the Article 104 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong which aimed to disqualify the two Youngspiration legislators Baggio Leung and Yau Wai-ching. [23] On the universities' independence banner row, a commentary titled "A rule must be set to make Hong Kong independence criminal" published on the state-owned Diario de la gente overseas edition website said the discussion on Hong Kong independence should be made illegal, just like it is illegal to promote Nazism in Germany. [29]

The Hong Kong government issued a statement after the formation of the Hong Kong National Party, stating that "any suggestion that Hong Kong should be independent or any movement to advocate such 'independence' is against the Basic Law, and will undermine the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and impair the interest of the general public… The SAR Government will take action according to the law." [18]

Political parties Edit

The pro-Beijing camp holds the same stance with the Beijing and SAR government and strongly opposes Hong Kong independence. The mainstream pan-democracy camp sympathised with the pro-independence cause but generally opposes Hong Kong independence as they do not think it would be beneficial to Hong Kong, nor practical or achievable. [48] They believe that to fight for genuine democracy and safeguard the high degree of autonomy under the "One Country, Two Systems" principle is the most foreseeable solution.

Although politicians and scholars like Chin Wan, Wong Yuk-man and Civic Passion's Wong Yeung-tat are seen as leading localist figures and have been close to the Hong Kong independence movement and even had advocated "nation building", they have also cut clear that they do not support Hong Kong independence during the midst of the Hong Kong LegCo candidates' disqualification controversy. They claim they fight for an amendment of the Basic Law through civil referendum to maintain Hong Kong's autonomy similar to that of Greenland's. [46]

Others Edit

The last British colonial governor Chris Patten opposes Hong Kong independence, worrying such activists would "dilute support" for democracy in Hong Kong: "[i]t would be dishonest, dishonourable and reckless of somebody like me, to pretend that the case for democracy should be mixed up with an argument about the independence of Hong Kong – something which is not going to happen, something which dilutes support for democracy, and something which has led to all sorts of antics which should not take place in a mature society aiming to be a full democracy." [56]

In September 2017, ten university heads in Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong Shue Yan University, Lingnan University, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the Education University of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, the Open University of Hong Kong and the University of Hong Kong stated that all the universities do not support Hong Kong independence as it contravenes the Basic Law. [31]

Reasons Edit

Reasons cited in favour of maintaining Hong Kong as part of China include:


'Rights and freedoms'

Hong Kong's government has said its proposed law is not aimed specifically at facilitating extraditions to mainland China. Rather, it says it's seeking to remedy a legal "loophole" so as to be able to send suspected criminals to jurisdictions with which it has no transfer agreement.

"The rule of law and judicial independence are the core values of the (Hong Kong government)," the local government said in a statement Wednesday responding to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission brief. The government "attaches utmost importance to these values and is determined to fully safeguard them and the safety of all members of the public."

Supporters stress safeguards — such as the exclusion of crimes of a political nature and those subject to the death penalty, as well as veto power over court-ordered extraditions by Hong Kong's top official — mean fears are unfounded.

"If you say you're worried, effectively you're saying you don't trust our own judiciary," Ronny Tong, a lawyer and advisor to Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam, told reporters at the Foreign Correspondents' Club on May 2 in a debate with legislator Dennis Kwok.

The impetus came after a murder in February last year allegedly by a Hong Kong citizen in Taiwan who later fled home.

It highlighted not only the lack of an extradition mechanism with the self-governed island, but also with other places including China and nearby Macau, which is a semi-autonomous Chinese region like Hong Kong.

Opponents say there are ad hoc judicial procedures to handle situations such as the Taiwan case and question why the government would be willing to weaken its legal system in relation to China.

"This exception that we have in our laws, that we do not extradite people to other parts of mainland China, was not a mistake, it was not a loophole," Kwok said at the debate. "It was deliberately put there in order to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the Hong Kong people."

Kwok expressed a worry that China, where he said the legal system is not independent and utilizes forced confessions, would abuse any extradition arrangement.

"They could weaponize this system the same way they've weaponized their own system against their own citizens," he said.

China's foreign ministry office in Hong Kong did not respond to a request from CNBC for comment on Kwok's characterization and has appeared to largely stay out of the fray. It said on its website last month that any legal change to allow extraditions "is an internal affair" of the local government.

But Geng Shuang, a spokesman at the foreign ministry in Beijing, criticized the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission brief, saying at a regular press conference on Wednesday that China opposes "any foreign interference in Hong Kong's affairs because they are entirely China's internal affairs," according to a transcript on the ministry website.

The extradition law fight is far from the only issue to raise questions over a perceived unwillingness by Hong Kong's government to defend local freedoms.

In an unprecedented move in October, it expelled a British journalist who hosted a local independence advocate for a speech at the Foreign Correspondents' Club that angered Beijing.

Last month nine people were convicted in relation to 2014 protests for fuller democracy in Hong Kong, with four getting prison terms.


Alojamiento

Historically, housing has been a major problem in Hong Kong, where space is limited and the number of occupants ever-growing. Changes in the residential environment between the establishment of the colony in 1842 and the Japanese occupation in 1941 were moderate, compared to those that took place in the postwar years. There was no planning in the earlier days of development, except that generally the British lived on the Peak (the area around Victoria Peak), other nationalities in the Mid-Levels (below the Peak), and the wealthy on somewhat higher ground, where the grand garden houses and large mansions remain as landmarks. Most of the Chinese lived on the lowlands surrounding the harbour, where the streets were narrow and the houses made of wood, bricks, and mortar. The houses lacked not only good natural lighting and ventilation but also piped water and flush toilets. Frequently urban development was the result of plagues, fires, and typhoons rather than of comprehensive city planning. However, the government has made efforts to construct public housing and to reduce the number of squatters and street sleepers in the region.

The limited housing supply was further reduced by the ravages of World War II. In the early postwar years, more than half of all families shared accommodations with others, living in cubicles, bed spaces, and attics and on roofs and verandas and in similar quarters. The colonial government’s reluctant involvement in housing provision began with the building of resettlement blocks for fire victims in 1953, but it took real impetus in the early 1960s when the great demand for urban land resulted in the relocation of large numbers of squatters and urban poor. Public housing came to accommodate more than half of the population, most of them living far from the urban core, though by the early 21st century the proportion of the populace in public units was about one-third. Large numbers of people have settled into the new towns, and the design capacity for most of these areas has been increased.


Contenido

In the year 1895, the Qing dynasty, which was recognized as the legitimate government of China at the time, lost the First Sino-Japanese War and was forced to cede Taiwan and Penghu to the Empire of Japan after signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Over sixteen years later, the Qing dynasty was overthrown and was replaced by the Republic of China (1912–1949) (ROC) the founding date of the ROC is 1 January 1912. Based on the Theory of the Succession of States, the ROC originally lay claim to the entire territory which belonged to the Qing, except for Taiwan, which the ROC recognised as belonging to the Empire of Japan at the time. The ROC managed to attain widespread recognition as the legitimate successor state to the Qing dynasty during the years following the ousting of the Qing.

In the year 1945, the ROC won the Second Sino-Japanese War, which was intertwined with World War II, and took control of Japanese Taiwan on behalf of the World War II Allies, following the Japanese surrender. The ROC immediately asserted its claim to Taiwan as "Taiwan Province, Republic of China", basing its claim on the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Communique. Around this time, the ROC nullified the Treaty of Shimonoseki, declaring it to be one of the many "Unequal Treaties" imposed on China (under the Qing) during the so-called "Century of Humiliation". At the time, the Kuomintang (KMT) was the ruling party of the ROC, and was widely recognized as its legitimate representative, especially due to the collaboration of its leader Chiang Kai-shek with the World War II Allies.

However, throughout much of the reign of the ROC, China had been internally divided, during a period which is known as the "Warlord Era of China". According to the common narrative, the ROC was divided into many different ruling cliques and secessionist states, which were in a constant power struggle following the power vacuum which was created after the overthrowal of the Qing. During this period, two ruling cliques eventually came out on top that of the KMT, backed by the United States, and that of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), backed by the Soviet Union. The power struggle between these two specific political parties has come to be known as the Chinese Civil War. The Chinese Civil War was fought sporadically throughout the ROC's history it was interrupted by the Second Sino-Japanese War.

After the Second Sino-Japanese War concluded, the Chinese Civil War resumed, and the CCP quickly gained a huge advantage over the KMT (ruling the ROC). In 1949, the KMT evacuated its government (the ROC), its military, and around 1.2–2 million loyal citizens to Taiwan, which had only been ruled by the KMT for around four years by this time. Back in mainland China, the CCP proclaimed the "People's Republic of China (PRC)", effectively creating a reality of Two Chinas. Following the creation of Two Chinas, the PRC began to fight a diplomatic war against the ROC on Taiwan over official recognition as the sole legitimate government of China. Eventually, the PRC (mostly) won this war, and ascended to the position of "China" in the United Nations in 1971, evicting the ROC from that same position.

This left an awkward situation where the ROC still ruled Taiwan but was not recognized as a member state of the United Nations. In recent years, membership in the United Nations has become almost an essential qualifier of statehood. Most states with limited recognition are not at all recognized by most governments and intergovernmental organizations. However, the ROC on Taiwan is a unique case, given that it has still managed to attain a significant degree of unofficial international recognition, even though most countries do not officially recognize its existence. This is mainly due to the fact that the ROC was previously recognized as the legitimate government of China, providing an extensive framework for unofficial diplomatic relations to be conducted between the ROC on Taiwan and other countries.

In the years following the ROC's retreat to Taiwan, Taiwan has gone through a series of significant social, political, economic, and cultural shifts, strengthening the divide between Taiwan and mainland China. This has been further exacerbated by Taiwan's history as a colony of the Japanese Empire, which led to the establishment of a unique Taiwanese identity and the desire for Taiwan independence. The Taiwan independence movement has grown considerably stronger in recent decades, and has especially become a viable force on the island ever since the ROC's transition to multi-party politics, during what has become known as the Democratization of Taiwan. Due to this new political reality, independence-oriented parties have been able to gain majority control over Taiwan (ROC) via elections.

China (PRC) has never recognized the existence of Two Chinas. China (PRC) asserts that the ROC ceased to exist in the year 1949, when the PRC was proclaimed. Officially, China (PRC) refers to the territory controlled by Taiwan (ROC) as "Taiwan area", and to the government of Taiwan (ROC) as the "Taiwan authorities". China (PRC) continues to claim Taiwan as its 23rd Province, and the Fujianese territories still under Taiwanese (ROC) control as parts of Fujian Province. China (PRC) has established the One-China policy in order to clarify its intention. In 2005, China (PRC) passed the "Anti-Secession Law" in order to discourage Taiwan independence sentiments and in order to legitimize the use of force against Taiwan, which it claims would fall under the definition of an "internal conflict of China", if Taiwan approaches independence.

Most Taiwanese (ROC) people oppose joining China (PRC) for various reasons, including fears of the loss of Taiwan (ROC)'s democracy, human rights, and Taiwanese nationalism. Opponents either favour maintaining the status quo of the Republic of China administrating Taiwan or the pursuit of Taiwan independence. [1] The ROC Constitution states that its territory includes the mainland, [2] but the official policy of the ROC government is dependent on which coalition is currently in power. The position of the Pan-Blue Coalition, which comprises the Kuomintang (KMT), the People First Party and the New Party is to eventually incorporate the mainland into the ROC, while the position of Pan-Green Coalition, composed of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union, is to pursue Taiwan independence. [3]

China mainland Edit

The concept of Chinese unification was developed in the 1970s as part of the Chinese Communist Party's strategy to address the "Taiwan Issue" as China (PRC) started to normalize foreign relations with a number of countries including the United States [4] and Japan. [5]

According to china.org.cn, in 1979, the National People's Congress (of China) published the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” ( 告台湾同胞书 ) which included the term "Chinese reunification" as an ideal for Cross-Strait relations. [6] [ se necesita una mejor fuente ] In 1981, the Chairman of the People's Congress Standing Committee Ye Jianying announced the "Nine Policies" for China (PRC)'s stance on Cross-Strait relations, with "Chinese Peaceful Unification" ( 祖国和平统一 ) as the first policy. [7] According to Xinhua, since then, "One Country Two Systems" and "Chinese reunification" have been emphasized at every National Congress of the Communist Party as the principles to "deal with" Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (ROC). "One Country, Two Systems" is specifically about China (PRC)'s policy towards post-colonial Hong Kong and Macao, and "Chinese Unification" is specifically about Taiwan (ROC). [8] Taiwan (ROC) has also been offered the resolution of "One Country Two Systems” [ cita necesaria ]

Taiwan Edit

Taiwan has a complicated history of being administered by larger foreign powers including the Dutch East India Company, the Southern Ming Dynasty, the Qing dynasty and the Empire of Japan. Taiwan first came under Chinese control when it was invaded by the Manchu-led Qing dynasty in 1683. [9]

The island remained under Qing rule until 1895 when it fell under the control of the Empire of Japan. Following the Axis power's defeat in World War II in 1945, the Kuomintang-led Republic of China gained control of Taiwan. [9] Some Taiwanese resisted ROC rule in the years following World War II. The ROC violently suppressed this resistance which culminated in the 228 Massacre of 1947. [10] With the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1950, Taiwan and China were separated from each other with governments on both sides aiming for a military takeover of the other.

The irredentist narrative emphasizing the importance of a united Greater China Area, which purportedly include Taiwan, arose in both the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party in the years during and after the civil war. For the PRC, the claim of the Greater China Area was part of a nationalist argument for territorial integrity. In the civil war years it set the communist movement apart from the ROC, which had lost Manchuria, the homeland of the Qing Emperors, to Japan in 1932. [11]

Rise of Tangwai and Taiwanese nationalism Edit

From the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1950 until the mid-1970s the concept of unification was not the main subject of discourse between the governments of the PRC and the ROC. The Kuomintang (KMT) believed that they would, probably with American help, one day retake China, while Mao Zedong's communist regime would collapse in a popular uprising and the Kuomintang forces would be welcomed. [12]

By the 1970s, the Kuomintang's authoritarian military dictatorship in Taiwan (led by the Chiang family) was becoming increasingly untenable due to the popularity of the Tangwai movement and Taiwanese nationalists. In 1970, then-Vice Premier (and future President) Chiang Ching-kuo survived an assassination attempt in New York City by Cheng Tzu-tsai and Peter Huang, both members of the World United Formosans for Independence. In 1976, Wang Sing-nan sent a mail bomb to then-Governor of Taiwan Province Hsieh Tung-min, who suffered serious injuries to both hands as a result. [13] The Kuomintang's heavy-handed oppression in the Kaohsiung Incident, alleged involvement in the Lin family massacre and the murders of Chen Wen-chen and Henry Liu, and the self-immolation of Cheng Nan-jung galvanized the Taiwanese community into political actions and eventually led to majority rule and democracy in Taiwan.

The concept of unification replaced the concept of liberation by the PRC in 1979 as it embarked, after Mao's death, on economic reforms and pursued a more pragmatic foreign policy. In Taiwan, the possibility of retaking China became increasingly remote in the 1970s, particularly after Taiwan's expulsion from the United Nations in 1971, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and United States in 1979, and Chiang Kai-shek's death in 1975. [11]

Majority rule in Taiwan Edit

With the end of authoritarian rule in the 1980s, there was a shift in power within the KMT away from the faction who had accompanied Chiang to Taiwan. Taiwanese who grew up under Japanese rule, which account for more than 85% of the population, gained more influence and the KMT began to move away from its ideology of cross-strait unification. After the exposure of 1987 Lieyu Massacre in June, Martial law was finally lifted in Taiwan on 15 July 1987. Following the Wild Lily student movement, President Lee Teng-hui announced in 1991 that his government no longer disputed the rule of the Communists in China, leading to semi-official peace talks (leading to what would be termed as the "1992 consensus") between the two sides. The PRC broke off these talks in 1999 when President Lee described relations with the PRC as "special state-to-state".

Until the mid-1990s, unification supporters on Taiwan were bitterly opposed to the Communist Party. Since the mid-1990s a considerable warming of relations between the Communist Party and Taiwanese unification supporters, as both oppose the pro-Taiwan independence bloc. This brought about the accusation that unification supporters were attempting to sell out Taiwan. They responded saying that closer ties with mainland China, especially economic ties, are in Taiwan's interest.

Rise of the Democratic Progressive Party Edit

After the ROC Presidential elections of 2000, which brought the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party's candidate President Chen Shui-bian to power, the Kuomintang, faced with defections to the People First Party, expelled Lee Teng-hui and his supporters and reoriented the party towards unification. At the same time, the People's Republic of China shifted its efforts at unification away from military threats (which it de-emphasized but did not renounce) towards economic incentives designed to encourage Taiwanese businesses to invest in China and aiming to create a pro-Beijing bloc within the Taiwanese electorate.

Within Taiwan, unification supporters tend to see "China" as a larger cultural entity divided by the Chinese Civil War into separate states or governments within the country. In addition, supporters see Taiwanese identity as one piece of a broader Chinese identity rather than as a separate cultural identity. However, supporters do oppose desinicization inherent in Communist ideology such as that seen during the Cultural Revolution, along with the effort to emphasize a Taiwanese identity as separate from a Chinese one. As of the 2008 election of President Ma Ying-Jeou, the KMT agreed to the One China principle, but defined it as led by the Republic of China rather than the People's Republic of China.

One China, Two Systems proposal Edit

According to the 1995 proposal outlined by CPC General secretary and President Jiang Zemin, Taiwan would lose sovereignty and the right to self-determination, but would keep its armed forces and send a representative to be the "number two leader" in the PRC central government, in accord with the One China, Two Systems approach adopted for Hong Kong and Macau. [ cita necesaria ] Thus, under this proposal, the Republic of China would become fully defunct. [ cita necesaria ]

Few Taiwanese are in support of "One Country, Two Systems" while some unification supporters argued to uphold the status quo until mainland China democratized and industrialized to the same level as Taiwan. In the 2000 presidential election, independent candidate James Soong proposed a European Union-style relation with mainland China (this was echoed by Hsu Hsin-liang in 2004) along with a non-aggression pact. In the 2004 presidential election, Lien Chan proposed a confederation-style relationship. Beijing objected to the plan, claiming that Taiwan was already part of China, and was not a state and therefore could not form a confederation with it.

Stasis Edit

Unification proposals were not actively floated in Taiwan and the issue remained moot under President Chen Shui-bian, who refused to accept talks under Beijing's pre-conditions. Under the PRC administration of Hu Jintao, incorporating Taiwan lost emphasis amid the reality that the DPP presidency in Taiwan would be held by pro-independence President Chen until 2008. Instead, the emphasis shifted to meetings with politicians who opposed independence.

A series of high-profile visits in 2005 to China by the leaders of the three pan-blue coalition parties was seen as an implicit recognition of the status quo by the PRC government. Notably, Kuomintang chairman Lien Chan's trip was marked by unedited coverage of his speeches and tours (and some added positive commentary) by government-controlled media and meetings with high level officials including Hu Jintao. Similar treatment (though marked with less historical significance and media attention) was given during subsequent visits by PFP chairman James Soong and New Party chairman Yok Mu-ming. The Communists and the Pan-Blue Coalition parties emphasized their common ground in renewed negotiations under the 1992 consensus, opening the three links, and opposing Taiwan's formal independence.

The PRC passed an Anti-Secession Law shortly before Lien's trip. While the Pan-Green Coalition held mass rallies to protest the codification of using military force to retake Taiwan, the Pan-Blue Coalition was largely silent. The language of the Anti-Secession Law was clearly directed at the independence supporters in Taiwan (termed "'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces" in the law) and designed to be somewhat acceptable to the Pan-Blue Coalition. It did not explicitly declare Taiwan to be part of the People's Republic of China but instead used the term "China" on its own, allowing definitional flexibility. It made repeated emphasis of "promoting peaceful national unification" but left out the concept of "one country, two systems" and called for negotiations in "steps and phases and with flexible and varied modalities" in recognition of the concept of eventual rather than immediate incorporation of Taiwan. In 2020, Li Keqiang left out the word "peaceful" when referring to unification with Taiwan, indicating a possible policy shift. [14]

Under both President Chen and President Ma Ying-jeou, the main political changes in cross-straits relationship involved closer economic ties and increased business and personal travel. Such initiatives was met by grassroots oppositions such as the Sunflower Student Movement, which successfully scuttled Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement in 2014. President Ma Ying-Jeou advocated for the revitalization of Chinese culture, as in the re-introduction of Traditional Chinese in texts to mainland China used in Taiwan and historically in China. It expressed willingness to allow Simplified Chinese to be used for informal writing.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses the phrase "reunification" instead of "unification" to emphasize its assertion that Taiwan has always belonged to China, or that Taiwan has been part of China since ancient times, and that Taiwan currently belongs to People's Republic of China (but is currently being sporadically occupied by alleged separatists who support Taiwan independence) [ cita necesaria ]. The PRC does not consider the Republic of China to still exist today, instead believing itself to be the ROC's successor after the PRC's founding in 1949.

Taiwan and Penghu Edit

Officially, the PRC traces Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, allegedly historically known by the Chinese as "Liuqiu" (which is closely related to the name of the modern Japanese Ryukyu Islands), back to roughly around the 3rd century CE (specifically the year 230 CE). [15] However, most Western sources officially trace Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan back to either 1661–1662 CE (the year(s) when Koxinga established the Kingdom of Tungning in southwestern Taiwan) or 1683 CE (the year when the Qing dynasty (of China) absorbed the Kingdom of Tungning into its territory and subsequently lay claim to the entire island). [ cita necesaria ]

Kinmen, Matsu and Wuqiu Edit

The islands that are part of Fujian Province, Republic of China (Taiwan), namely Kinmen and Matsu as well as the Wuqiu Islands (of Kinmen) are claimed by PRC. These islands were never parts of the Empire of Japan, unlike Taiwan and Penghu.

PRC considers the islands to be part of mainland China. The Pan-Blue Coalition of Taiwan (ROC) generally agrees with this position, though the Pan-Green Coalition of Taiwan is divided on the issue of whether Kinmen and Matsu are part of Taiwan or part of mainland China. Kinmenese and Matsunese people do not generally self-identify as "Taiwanese".

Taiwanese politics is divided into two main camps, the Pan-Blue and the Pan-Green. The former camp is characterised by general Chinese nationalism and ROC nationalism, whereas the latter camp is characterised by Taiwanese nationalism.

Taiwanese (ROC) sources, regardless of whether they are Pan-Blue or Pan-Green, generally seem to trace Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan back to the year 1683, when Taiwan was incorporated into the Qing dynasty of China. [16] This is starkly different from the official PRC claim, which extends for nearly two millennia.

Most Taiwanese (ROC) scholars agree that the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) ceded Taiwan in perpetuity to Japan in 1895. However, there is disagreement over whether or not this treaty was nullified in the aftermath of the Second Sino-Japanese War, and over what Taiwan's current political status is.

Pan-Blue Edit

The Japanese Instrument of Surrender (1945) is seen by the Pan-Blue camp as legitimising the Chinese claims of sovereignty over Taiwan which were made with the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration (1945). [17] The common Pan-Blue view asserts that Taiwan was returned to China in 1945. Irredentist in nature, those who possess this view commonly perceive Retrocession Day to be the conclusion to a continuous saga of reunification struggles on both sides of the strait, lasting from 1895, the year that Taiwan was ceded to Japan, up until 1945, the end of the Second World War. Hence, there is a common view among the Pan-Blue camp that Taiwan was always a Chinese territory under Japanese occupation and never belonged to Japan, whether legally or in spirit. The Cairo Declaration, Potsdam Declaration, and Japanese Instrument of Surrender are seen as proofs that the Treaty of Shimonoseki was nullified in its entirety in 1945, hence proving that Taiwan always rightfully belonged to China throughout those fifty years of reunification struggles. Shortly following these events, Taiwan was split from mainland China again, according to the common Pan-Blue view, marking the beginning of another reunification saga. Still, the Pan-Blue camp considers both Taiwan and mainland China to be currently under Chinese rule, with the division between Taiwan and mainland China merely being internal, rather than directly the result of outsider aggression this view is demonstrated through the 1992 Consensus, an agreement reached between officials of both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China in 1992, which suggests that there is One China and that Taiwan is part of China, but that the legitimate government of China can be interpreted differently by the two sides of the strait.

Taiwanese singer Teresa Teng performed in many countries around the world but never in mainland China. During her 1980 TTV concert, when asked about such possibility, she responded by stating that the day she performs on the mainland will be the day the Three Principles of the People ( 三民主義 ) are implemented there – in reference to either the pursuit of Chinese democracy or reunification under the banner of the ROC." [18] [19] [20]

Kinmen has a prominent white wall with giant red characters "三民主義統一中國" meaning "Reunify China under Three Principles of the People.


Hong Kong's 20 years under Chinese rule – A failed project?

As Hong Kong celebrates the 20th anniversary of its return to Chinese rule, it can boast of its freedom of assembly and an independent press. But many residents are dissatisfied with a lack of democratic freedom.

Twenty years ago, on July 1, many experts thought it was possible that Hong Kong could be a positive political influence on mainland China. "What if Hong Kong takes over China?" the Economist magazine asked. "China can and should learn from Hong Kong. It is a pupil, not a teacher," wrote Thomas Heberer, a German Sinologist.

Fast forward to today, it is clear that none of these optimistic assessments came true. The possibilities of a mutual influence have clearly manifested in favor of the mainland.

Under current Chinese President Xi Jinping, China has managed to combine economic liberalization, growth and one-party rule. Hong Kong, on the other hand, could not become an alternative model of society for the mainland, also because it is economically less important for Beijing than 20 years ago.

Beijing does not accept any interference in its sovereignty over the Special Administrative Region. It has strengthened its control over the affairs of the city and is ready to confront pro-democracy and pro-independence forces - a development whose outcome remains uncertain.

What Hong Kong residents and the pro-democracy "Umbrella Movement" activists fear is that Hong Kong will be coerced into acting like any other Chinese city.

"Hong Kong is not Shenzhen," says Victoria Hui, a Hong Kong-born American and chronicler of the city's democracy movement, referring to the Chinese city located to the north of Hong Kong. "There are political as well as economic freedoms in Hong Kong."

Unfulfilled promises

"Many people in Hong Kong are bitterly frustrated by their lack of say in how they are governed," the Economist notes in its June 24 edition.

As Britain started Hong Kong's return negotiations with China in the 1980s, it tried to secure old civil rights and establish new democratic procedures for the people in Hong Kong. Thus, in the joint Sino-British Declaration of 1984, there was a talk of a "high degree of autonomy" and that "Hong Kong would be governed by the Hong Kongers." With these slogans, Beijing wanted to calm Hong Kong's citizens and prevent an exodus in view of an imminent return to the communist rule.

Similar formulations entered the "Basic Law" for Hong Kong that was adopted by the Chinese People's Congress in 1990. According to the charter, anchored in the principle "one country, two systems," the economic and social systems practised under British rule would remain intact for 50 years from the time of Hong Kong's handover to China. It also included provisions for eventual democratic elections for Hong Kong's parliament (Legislative Council) and the head of the administration (Chief Executive), but Beijing continued to delay them.

In August 2014, China allowed a general election in Hong Kong but only among pre-selected candidates. This led to mass protests and strikes that partially paralyzed Hong Kong's everyday life from September to December 2014.


Differences in Stock Markets

The Hong Kong Stock Exchange has been the preferred destination choice for most Chinese companies looking to raise capital, as the mainland Chinese stock markets are more restrictive and have higher financial requirements. Hong Kong's stock market also attracts more overseas investors.

"Hong Kong has multiple advantages that are missing in China. First, a registration-based IPO system, which enables listing to be relatively faster and easier than in the mainland. Second, the absence of capital controls and greater international exposure, which allows Hong Kong to serve as an anchor point for global expansion. Third, a sound financial infrastructure, which mitigates operational costs. Fourth, an effective regulatory framework, which focuses on transparency and prudent minimum standards," wrote Tianlei Huang research analyst at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. "Neither Shanghai nor Shenzhen is likely to win this competition with Hong Kong, at least over the short term."  

In mid-Nov. 2014, a program titled "Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect" was launched, which established a cross-border channel for access to stock markets and investment. This arrangement allows investors in these regions to trade specified companies listed on each other’s stock exchange through their local securities firm. There was no direct access for individual investors in Hong Kong (or overseas) to Chinese stocks before this. In Dec. 2016, a similar "Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect" was launched.  

As of the end of 2018, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange listed 1,146 mainland Chinese companies, nearly 50% of the total number on the exchange. In terms of market capitalization, these companies accounted for almost 68% of the stock market in Hong Kong.   By the end of 2019, Hong Kong's stock market was the third-largest in Asia and fifth-largest in the world by market capitalization at $4.9 trillion.  


Reintegration with China, 1978-1997

The Open Door Policy of the PRC announced by Deng Xiao-ping at the end of 1978 marked a new era for Hong Kong’s economy. With the newly vigorous engagement of China in international trade and investment, Hong Kong’s integration with the mainland accelerated as it regained its traditional role as that country’s main provider of commercial and financial services. From 1978 to 1997, visible trade between Hong Kong and the PRC grew at an average rate of 28% per annum. At the same time, Hong Kong firms began to move their labor-intensive activities to the mainland to take advantage of cheaper labor. The integration of Hong Kong with the Pearl River delta in Guangdong is the most striking aspect of these trade and investment links. At the end of 1997, the cumulative value of Hong Kong’s direct investment in Guangdong was estimated at US$48 billion, accounting for almost 80% of the total foreign direct investment there. Hong Kong companies and joint ventures in Guangdong province employed about five million people. La mayoría de estas empresas eran de ensamblaje intensivo en mano de obra para la exportación, pero desde 1997 en adelante se ha incrementado la inversión en servicios financieros, turismo y comercio minorista.

Si bien la industria manufacturera se trasladó fuera de la colonia durante las décadas de 1980 y 1990, hubo un aumento en el sector de servicios. Esta transformación de la estructura de la economía de Hong Kong de las manufacturas a los servicios fue espectacular. Lo más notable fue que se logró sin tambalear las tasas de crecimiento en general, y con una tasa de desempleo promedio de sólo 2.5% de 1982 a 1997. La Figura 2 muestra que el valor de la manufactura alcanzó su punto máximo en 1992 antes de comenzar una caída absoluta. Por el contrario, el valor de los servicios comerciales y financieros se disparó. Esto se refleja en la contribución de los servicios y la manufactura al PIB que se muestra en la Figura 3. El empleo en el sector de servicios aumentó del 52% al 80% de la fuerza laboral de 1981 a 2000, mientras que el empleo en la manufactura cayó del 39% al 10% en el mismo período. período.


Ver el vídeo: Hong Kong: Un país, dos sistemas cómo funciona? (Junio 2022).


Comentarios:

  1. Radford

    Yo sobre tal todavía no escuché

  2. Flynt

    En mi opinión no tienes razón. estoy seguro Vamos a discutir.

  3. Weallere

    Parece leer con atención pero no entiendo

  4. Balduin

    Hay algo en esto. Gracias por la información, ahora no cometeré tal error.

  5. Bazuru

    El momento interesante



Escribe un mensaje